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Abstract 
 
 
Objective: Repetitive negative thinking (RNT) e.g., worry in generalized anxiety disorder 
(GAD) and rumination in depression, is often targeted during psychological treatments. To 
test the hypothesis that negative interpretation bias contributes to worry and rumination, we 
assessed the effects of inducing more positive interpretations in reducing RNT. 
Method: Volunteers diagnosed with GAD (66) or Depression (65) were randomly allocated 
to one of two versions of Cognitive Bias Modification (CBM-I), either with or without RNT 
priming prior to training), or a control condition, each involving 10 internet-delivered 
sessions. Outcome measures of interpretation bias, a behavioral RNT task and self-reported 
worry, rumination, anxiety and depression were obtained at baseline, after home-based 
training and at 1-month follow up (self-report questionnaires only). 
Results: CBM-I training, across diagnostic groups, promoted a more positive interpretation 
bias and led to reductions in worry, rumination, and depressive symptoms, which were 
maintained at follow up. Anxiety symptoms were reduced only in the GAD group at follow 
up. There were no differences between CBM-I versions; brief priming of RNT did not 
influence CBM-I effectiveness. Level of interpretation bias post training partially mediated 
the effects of CBM-I on follow-up questionnaire scores.  
Conclusions: In contrast to some recent failures to demonstrate improvements following 
internet-delivered CBM, we found that self-reported RNT and negative mood were reduced 
by CBM-I. This is consistent with a causal role for negative interpretation bias in both worry 
and rumination, suggesting a useful role for CBM-I within treatments for anxiety and 
depression.  
 
Key words: Generalized anxiety disorder (GAD); Depression; interpretation bias; cognitive 
bias modification (CBM); repetitive negative thinking   
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Public Health Significance Statements 
Many people worry about the future, or mull over negative events from the past (rumination). 
These types of unhelpful repetitive negative thinking can maintain clinical anxiety and 
depression. This study indicates that simple regular practice in making positive interpretations 
of emotionally ambiguous information reduces repetitive negative thinking in individuals with 
clinical anxiety or depression, and also improves mood.   
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Interpretation Training to Target Repetitive Negative Thinking in Generalized Anxiety 
Disorder and Depression 
Repetitive negative thinking (RNT) occurs in many emotional disorders, with worry 
and rumination being the two most obvious examples. Uncontrollable worry about multiple 
future events is central to the diagnosis of Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD), while 
rumination (repeatedly thinking about past or current concerns) is more often reported (along 
with worry) in Depression. Both these forms of RNT are characterized by their negative 
content, an over-general abstract style and – in pathological conditions – their apparently 
uncontrollable and perseverative nature. These overlapping characteristics, as well as their co-
occurrence within individuals and across disorders, have led to them being conceptualized as 
a transdiagnostic process termed repetitive negative thinking (Drost, van der Does, van 
Hemert, Penninx, & Spinhoven, 2014). 
Although similar in many respects, worry and rumination are sometimes described as 
differing in content, with worry focused on possible future threats and rumination more likely 
to concern past/ongoing personal failures. Consequently, it remains unclear whether they are 
underpinned by the same cognitive mechanisms and, furthermore, whether they can be 
modified using the same methods. This is of some importance, given the assumed role of 
RNT in maintaining clinical disorders. For example, rumination prolongs depression episodes 
(Watkins, 2008) and worry maintains anxiety (Hirsch & Mathews, 2012).  
 Hirsch and Mathews (2012) identified three critical processes thought to underlie 
pathological worry, namely emotional processing biases favoring negative information, a 
verbal thinking style, and deficits in attentional control. In the current study, we focus on 
emotional processing biases and specifically on negative interpretation bias – the tendency to 
habitually interpret ambiguous information as negative or threatening - and investigate 
whether this bias plays a similar causal role in both worry and rumination.  
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Basic Research on the Nature of Interpretation 
Early studies of how ambiguous information is resolved during reading revealed that, 
in early stages of processing, alternate resolutions are activated prior to one interpretation 
reaching awareness. Thus, after reading a sentence such as “He played the ace of Spades”, 
one is not usually aware of alternative meanings of “spade”, yet the decision to reject “dig” as 
being related to the sentence is initially slowed, although in proficient readers this interference 
effect dissipates very rapidly (Gernsbacher & Faust, 1991). These experiments imply that 
alternative but contextually irrelevant resolutions are typically activated, but are then quickly 
suppressed prior to awareness. Which meaning of ambiguous information becomes dominant 
depends partly on context (as in the above example), but is also influenced by its prior 
frequency of use. Thus, the homograph “growth” is likely to prime “plant” more than “tumor” 
for a gardener, but probably the converse for an oncologist. Eysenck, Mogg, May, Richards, 
and Mathews (1991) tested the related hypothesis that emotional disorders are similarly 
associated with resolutions of ambiguity that are congruent with habitual thought content. 
Individuals with GAD were more likely than non-anxious controls to interpret ambiguous 
sentences in terms of the threatening rather than their benign meaning. Similarly, Butler and 
Mathews (1983), Mathews, Richards, and Eysenck (1989), Mogg, Baldwin, Brodrick, and 
Bradley (2004), and Anderson et al. (2012) identified a negative interpretation bias 
(henceforth interpretation bias) in people suffering from GAD. Negative interpretations are 
also evident in clinical and sub-clinically depressed individuals (e.g. Nunn, Mathews, & 
Trower, 1997; Berna, Lang, Goodwin, & Holmes, 2011), particularly in relation to self-
referent information (Wisco & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2010). According to a recent meta-analysis, 
interpretation bias in depression has a medium effect size (Everaert, Podina, & Koster, 2017). 
Hence, there is evidence of interpretation biases across depression and GAD.  
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As discussed above, RNT is common across depression and GAD. Hirsch and 
Mathews (2012) suggest that worry episodes can be triggered by negative interpretations and, 
once begun, subsequent interpretations direct worry to increasingly negative content. Suarez 
and Bell-Dolan (2001) demonstrated that children with higher trait worry generated more 
negative interpretations. In adults, Mor, Hertel, Ngo, Shachar, and Redak (2014) found that 
greater levels of rumination were associated with more negative interpretations. In a study 
related to the current paper (Krahé, Whyte, Bridge, Loizou & Hirsch, submitted), levels of 
trait worry and rumination were both associated with interpretation bias across individuals 
with depression or GAD, and community controls, even when controlling for levels of 
depression and anxiety. Hence, both worry and rumination appear to be related to degree of 
interpretation bias.  
Other research has investigated whether biases of interpretation can be acquired in 
unselected volunteers by repeated presentation of emotional ambiguity which is then 
consistently resolved in either a positive or negative direction (e.g., Grey & Mathews, 2000; 
Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000; see Hertel & Mathews, 2011, and Hirsch, Meeten, Krahé, & 
Reeder, 2016, for reviews). It has been shown that single-session positive training procedures 
can result in positive emotional changes (e.g., Hoppitt, Mathews, Yiend, & Mackintosh, 
2010). Conversely, consistently reinforcing negative interpretations in unselected samples 
increases state rumination (Hertel, Mor, Ferrari, Hunt, & Agrawal, 2014).  
From Experimental Research to Clinical Application 
Further research has explored these modification methods in sub-clinical populations.  
Hindash and Rottenberg (2017) used single-session training to facilitate more benign 
interpretations in dysphoric individuals and found that this led to reduced stress reactivity.  
Other single-session studies designed to test the effectiveness of such training in individuals 
with elevated anxiety or depression have also given positive results. For example, in studies 
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of participants with high levels of worry or GAD, those allocated to positive training 
condition not only resolved new descriptions in a more positive manner than those allocated 
to a control condition, but also reported fewer negative thought intrusions in a subsequent test 
of worry (Hirsch, Hayes, & Mathews, 2009; Hayes, Hirsch, Krebs, & Mathews, 2010). 
Together these findings point to a causal role of interpretation bias in maintaining both 
worry and rumination. Thus, interpretation bias seems a promising candidate target for 
interventions designed to reduce both worry and rumination. Although important for our 
theoretical understanding, single-session CBM experiments do not provide evidence of any 
sustained impact of changing interpretation bias. Multi-session training over several days or 
weeks, where bias change is assessed after training, and including a post-training follow-up 
period, is necessary to investigate the longer-term effectiveness of CBM-I. If successful, this 
could allow widespread dissemination of these methods via the internet, so potentially 
reaching many people suffering from anxiety or depression who are unable or unwilling to 
attend clinics for treatment. 
However, whilst a number of multi-session studies CBM studies focusing on 
interpretation bias have shown promising results in terms of reductions in key 
symptomatology (e.g., Amir & Taylor, 2012; Lang, Blackwell, Harmer, Davison, & Holmes, 
2012, Pictet, Jermann, & Ceschi, 2016; Torkan et al., 2014), some other recent trials of CBM 
designed to modify processing biases via the internet have produced disappointing findings. 
Studies of attentional retraining for social anxiety (e.g. Carlbring et al., 2012) and of 
interpretation bias training in depression (e.g., Blackwell et al., 2015) have resulted in the 
supposedly active training methods having clinical outcomes no better than alternative control 
conditions. One key question to be resolved before further trials are conducted (particularly 
via the internet) concerns the factors needed for more effective and robust training methods. 
One possible explanation put forward for the failure of previous trials was that emotional 
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concerns naturally aroused in the clinic are absent during training conducted at home. It 
remains unclear, however, why this would influence training effects.  
 Recent animal and human research on memory reconsolidation (e.g., Nader & Hardt, 
2009) has shown that changing emotional memories depends critically on their re-activation 
prior to modification via new learning. In the same way, in the absence of the activation of 
emotional concerns, habitual emotional biases may be less easy to modify by replacing them 
with more positive learning experiences. Relating to this explanation, the same training 
method used in one unsuccessful trial of social anxiety (Carlbring et al., 2012) was repeated 
but with added instructions being given to engage in a socially challenging task prior to each 
practice session, and this addition significantly improved the outcome of training (Kuckertz et 
al., 2014). Although this improvement could be attributed to the additional exposure involved, 
other studies have suggested that activating concerns via instructions can also serve to 
enhance subsequent negative biases, consistent with the idea that activation effects may be 
achieved without actual behavioral exposure (Hertel & El-Messidi, 2006; Williams, Mathews, 
& Hirsch, 2014). Of course, these preliminary findings are hardly conclusive, and it remains 
possible that activation of emotional concerns could actually interfere with positive retraining, 
due to depletion of cognitive resources (Hayes, Hirsch, & Mathews, 2008; Stefanopoulou, 
Hirsch, Hayes, Adlam, & Coker, 2014) that may be necessary for relearning during CBM. In 
the present study, we investigated the effects of emotional activation prior to training trials 
compared with the same training given without such activation, to test whether prior 
activation of emotional concerns (thinking about worry or rumination-related topics) serves to 
enhance effects of bias modification (as expected from reconsolidation theory), or has no such 
effect, or even interferes adversely with positive relearning. 
The main aim of the present study was to determine whether interpretation bias 
contributes to worry in GAD and rumination in Depression. To do this, we evaluated the 
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effects of interpretation bias training on RNT in groups with either diagnoses of GAD or 
Depression, to investigate whether such training is similarly effective in reducing both worry 
and rumination, and also results in corresponding improvements in mood. The training task 
(based on Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000; Holmes & Mathews, 2005) involves repeated 
practice in listening to ambiguous event descriptions, which are resolved in a benign manner, 
each followed by a ‘comprehension’ question that requires confirmation of the positive 
resolution. In this way, participants are repeatedly but unobtrusively guided towards 
anticipating and generating positive resolutions of ambiguous situations. In many previous 
studies of this type, effects of training have been compared with those of a control condition 
in which ambiguous descriptions were resolved in a positive direction half of the time and 
negatively for the other half. However, as discussed in detail by Blackwell, Woud, and 
MacLeod (2017), selection of an appropriate control condition when attempting to determine 
the causal role of cognitive processes in psychopathology requires one that does not modify 
bias. While some multi-session studies using a control condition with 50:50 contingency have 
demonstrated greater training effects in the active condition than the control (e.g., Pictet et al., 
2016), others have failed to do so (e.g., Blackwell et al., 2015). It is possible that this 
contingency may inadvertently promote change by drawing attention to the possibility of 
different outcomes, particularly when many training sessions are completed over time, as 
acknowledged by Blackwell et al. (2015). Hence, we elected to build on Murphy, Hirsch, 
Mathews, Smith, and Clark (2007)’s control condition in which ambiguity remained 
unresolved. Consequently, training effects in the present experiment were compared to 
changes occurring in a group of participants randomly allocated to a control condition 
involving exposure to the same ambiguous material, but without being guided to either a 
negative or positive resolution.  
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The secondary aim of the study was to investigate the modulatory role of engaging in 
RNT prior to training, by including two positive training groups, one with and one without 
activation of emotional concerns (via worry or rumination) prior to training sessions, allowing 
the assessment of any differential effects due to such activation. Together, these design 
features were intended to answer questions relevant to possible treatment applications of 
cognitive bias modification as a way of reducing worry and rumination that could be readily 
accessed via the internet. 
Hypotheses 
1) First, for both GAD and depression groups, we predicted that CBM-I – with or 
without prior RNT activation – would promote a more positive interpretation bias and reduce 
consequent levels of worry and rumination, and psychological distress (levels of anxiety and 
depression) relative to the active control condition. In addition, we conducted planned 
subgroup analyses to investigate whether any effects of CBM-I on measures of worry, 
rumination, anxiety, and depression were diagnosis specific.  
2) Second, we expected prior RNT activation to modulate these effects, but examined 
the direction of this effect in an exploratory manner. In particular, we investigated whether 
RNT activation prior to CBM-I either enhanced the effects of training (by activating 
underlying cognitive biases, as in reconsolidation research), or reduced training effects 
(perhaps due to the additional demands placed on attentional control resources by RNT).  
3) Last, given its proposed underlying role, we expected that effects of CBM-I on 
worry and rumination, anxiety and depression at 1-month follow up would be mediated in part 
by post-intervention level of negative interpretation bias.  
Method 
Design 
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Community volunteers with GAD or depression were randomly allocated to one of 
three conditions: CBM-I with prior RNT (henceforth CBM_RNT), CBM-I without prior RNT 
(henceforth CBM_STAND), or an active control condition (henceforth CONTROL). Tasks 
assessing interpretation bias and a behavioral measure of RNT were administered during 
study visits prior to and following 10 computerized ‘training’ sessions. Questionnaire 
measures of RNT and mood were completed online prior to and following the block of 
training sessions, and additionally at 1-month follow up (see Krahé, Mathews, Whyte, & 
Hirsch, 2016 for the experimental protocol for this study, which has been previously 
published, with no changes to methods or procedures). It should be noted that this study was 
designed as an experiment to examine the role of interpretation bias in maintaining RNT, 
rather than as a clinical trial; hence, there was no clinical trial registration for this experiment. 
A flow chart of the experimental procedure is presented in Figure 1.  
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
Participants  
One hundred and fifty-seven participants with GAD or MDD were recruited from the 
community in Greater London via advertisements on websites and in newspapers, as well as 
via university circular emails and completed at least the first study visit at King’s College 
London. The CONSORT diagram is presented in Integral Supplementary Materials. 
Participants had to be fluent in English, with normal or corrected hearing, and between 18 and 
65 years old. They were initially screened for levels of anxiety and/or depression, that is, they 
had to have a total score ≥10 or five items scored ≥ 2 including items 1 and/or 2 on the PHQ-9 
(Kroenke & Spitzer, 2002), and/or a total score ≥ 10 and item 2 scored ≥ 2 on GAD-7 
(Spitzer, Kroenke, Williams, & Löwe, 2006). Individuals taking psychotropic medication had 
to be stabilized on that medication for at least 3 months without remission. Exclusion criteria 
were severe depression (≥ 23 PHQ-9 total score), past or current risk to self (self-harm in past 
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12 months / suicide attempt in last 5 years / PHQ-9 suicidal ideation item 9 scored > 
1;Williams, Blackwell, Holmes, & Andrews, 2013), co-morbid psychosis, bipolar disorder, 
borderline personality disorder or substance abuse, non-normal / not corrected to normal 
hearing (as the study involves listening to audio clips), as well as current or recent (past 6 
months) psychological treatment. Diagnosis of GAD or MDD was assessed using the 
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-V axis I disorders (SCID; First, Williams, Karg, & 
Spitzer, 2015) during a screening telephone assessment prior to the first study visit. An 
independent rater coded 20% of SCID assessments to check diagnosis; inter-rater agreement 
was excellent (Cohen’s kappa = .96). Participants with current co-morbid GAD and MDD 
were excluded. Of the 157 participants who completed visit 1 (baseline visit), 10 subsequently 
dropped out (6%), 5 completed 7 / 10 online sessions or returned for the second (post-
training) visit more than one month after the first visit (and thus did not count as ‘completers’; 
see below), 4 started treatment while enrolled in the study, and 7 were excluded for other 
reasons. The final sample used in the analysis comprised 131 individuals, with 44 in the 
CONTROL (22 GAD; 22 Depression) and CBM_STAND (22 GAD; 22 Depression) 
conditions, and 43 in the CBM_RNT condition (22 GAD; 21 Depression).1 2 Participant 
demographic characteristics across groups are presented in Table 1 (see Additional 
Supplementary Table 1 for characteristics for each group separately).  
 [INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
Experimental Conditions  
All conditions involved 10 sessions: one initial visit followed by nine sessions 
completed at home using a purpose-built online platform over the next three weeks to one 
                                                 
1The final sample of 131) did not differ from the 26 excluded participants on any questionnaire measures at visit 
1 (t (155) = 0.58, p = .560 for PHQ-9; t (155) = 1.24, p = .218 for GAD-7; t (155) = 0.97, p = .336 for PSWQ; t 
(155) = 0.84, p = .401 for RRS). 
2 See Krahé et al. (2016) for sample size and randomisation process. 
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month3. All online sessions began with either an RNT induction (CBM_RNT) or neutral task 
(CBM_STAND or CONTROL). Then, participants listened to 50 audio clips (henceforth 
scenarios), imagined themselves in each described situation, and then answered a 
comprehension question.  
Pre-scenario task: RNT induction or neutral task. 
RNT induction. The RNT induction was adapted from Hertel et al. (2014). 
Participants selected one of three themes (see Krahé et al., 2016 for details) about which  they 
had found themselves worrying (GAD) or ruminating (MDD) recently.  Each theme could be 
selected only once a week (three times in total) to ensure that all participants engaged in RNT 
across a variety of themes. Participants wrote a one-line summary of their RNT on the chosen 
topic and this was displayed on subsequent screens. They then wrote down their usual 
negative thoughts about the topic for three minutes (akin to Cohen, Mor, & Henik, 2015; 
Grisham, Flower, Williams, & Moulds, 2011). Finally, they worried/ruminated silently about 
their topic for two minutes and, as a manipulation check, rated their current level of worry, 
rumination, anxiety, and depression on 0 to 100% visual analogue scales. 
Neutral task. To control for the time taken during the RNT induction, participants in 
the CBM_STAND and CONTROL conditions completed a neutral task. They read neutral 
stories and made grammatical correctness judgments. At the end of the stories they also 
completed comprehension questions and rated their worry, rumination, anxiety, and 
depression.   
Main online scenario-based task.  
CBM-I. The CBM_RNT and CBM_STAND conditions required participants to listen 
to scenarios describing situations relating to common worry-related (GAD group) and 
                                                 
3 We allowed some leeway to complete any outstanding sessions; thus, the maximum time allowed to complete 
the sessions was one month (see also below). 
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rumination-related (MDD group) themes, which were emotionally ambiguous but eventually 
resolved in either a positive (76% of the time), or negative manner (12%), or were left 
unresolved (12% test trials) by the final words of the scenario. After each scenario, 
participants completed ‘comprehension’ questions that required endorsement of a response in 
keeping with the interpretation provided in the scenario (i.e., a positive interpretation in 
positive trials and negative in negative trials). They received feedback on the accuracy of 
these answers, except on ‘test’ trials in which ambiguity had not been resolved4.   
Worry scenarios were adapted from Mathews and Mackintosh (2000), Hirsch et al. 
(2009), Hayes et al. (2010), and Grol, et al. (2018), while rumination scenarios were adapted 
from Holmes, Mathews, Dalgleish, and Mackintosh (2006), Hertel et al. (2014), and 
Blackwell et al. (2015). Further scenarios were created by the authors, resulting in 500 unique 
worry-related and 500 unique rumination-related scenarios (see Krahé et al., 2016 for further 
details of materials).  
Participants selected one of the offered RNT main themes (see above) at the start of 
each session; this determined the type of scenarios used and also the theme participants 
worried/ruminated about if they were in the CBM_RNT condition.  
Control. In each session, control participants heard 50 ambiguous scenarios that 
remained unresolved. Half of the scenarios were followed by a Yes/No ‘comprehension’ 
question (as above) relating to the ambiguity of the scenario, but which was never followed 
by feedback, so allowing either interpretation without correction. The remainder was related 
to a factual element of the scenario, and these were followed by accuracy feedback. The ‘test’ 
trials from the CBM-I conditions were also included. 
Interpretation Bias Measures 
Scrambled sentences test (Wenzlaff & Bates, 1998; Wenzlaff & Bates, 2000). The 
scrambled sentences test involved participants using five of six presented words to form 
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grammatically correct sentences, which could either be of negative or positive valence. For 
example, “looks the future bright very dismal” could be unscrambled to form the sentence 
“the future looks very bright” (positive) or “the future looks very dismal” (negative). 
Participants were presented with 20 sentences to unscramble in five minutes, whilst holding in 
mind a string of six digits. Half the sentences related to worry themes and were generated by 
the authors, while half related to depressive rumination selected from Wenzlaff and Bates 
(1998) and Wenzlaff and Bates (2000). The number of positive sentences divided by the total 
number of grammatically correct sentences generated serves as an index of interpretation bias, 
with a higher index (scores range from 0 to 1) denoting a more positive interpretation bias. 
Two separate lists of 20 items were counterbalanced across participants over the two visits.  
Recognition test (based on Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000). In the first part of this 
task, participants read 20 ambiguous scenarios, and completed word fragments of the final 
word (which did not resolve the ambiguity – see Krahe et al., 2016 for details) and answered 
comprehension questions. After all scenarios had been completed, participants were presented 
with the title of each scenario, followed by four statements. Two statements were consistent 
with resolution of ambiguity in the scenario in either a positive or negative way (targets), 
while the other two statements were again positive or negative but were not legitimate 
interpretations (foils). Participants rated how similar each statement was to the meaning of the 
original scenario, with greater similarity ratings for positive targets indicating a more positive 
interpretation of that scenario (and similarly, greater similarity rating for negative targets 
indicating a more negative interpretation). Of the 20 scenarios, half related to worry (adapted 
from Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000, and Holmes et al., 2006) and half related to depressive 
rumination (created by the authors – see Krahe et al., 2016 for examples). A recognition test 
index was computed for each participant by subtracting mean ratings for negative targets from 
mean ratings for positive targets. Thus, higher scores denoted greater similarity ratings to 
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positive vs. negative targets i.e., a more positive interpretation bias. Participants completed 
the recognition test before and after the first online session at the first visit, and again at the 
second (post-training) visit; hence, three separate sets of 20 items were generated, with set 
order counterbalanced across participants.  
Worry and Rumination Measures 
Breathing focus task (Hirsch et al., 2009; Hayes et al., 2010; Hirsch, Mathews, 
Lequertier, Perman, & Hayes, 2013). Participants focused on their breathing for five 
minutes and indicated at random cued intervals whether they were focusing on their breathing 
or experiencing a thought intrusion. They categorized thought intrusions as negative, positive, 
or neutral, and provided brief summaries of content. They then engaged in worry (GAD 
group) or rumination (MDD group) about a current worry/rumination topic for five minutes, 
followed by another five-minute breathing focus period, with sampling as before. After each 
breathing focus period, participants were reminded of their summaries of thought intrusion in 
turn, and gave expanded descriptions of the thoughts experienced at the time of sampling, 
which were audio-recorded for later categorization as negative, positive, or neutral by an 
assessor who was blind to diagnostic group, condition, and breathing phase (pre- vs. post- 
period of worry/rumination). Another rater categorized intrusions from 25% of participants 
and assessors had excellent agreement (ICC = .96, 95% CIs =.95, .97). 
Standardized self-report questionnaires. See Krahe et al. (2016) for full details4. 
Trait worry levels were assessed using the Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer, 
Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990; Cronbach’s α = .79 at baseline in the present sample). 
Trait rumination was measured using the Ruminative Response Scale (RRS; Nolen-Hoeksema 
& Morrow, 1991; Cronbach’s α = .89).  
                                                 
4Participants also completed a novel 15-item ‘RNT questionnaire’ (RNTQ) that was designed to assess a range 
of different potential aspects of RNT and its consequences. This measure is under development and has not yet 
been validated and results are thus reported in Additional Supplementary Materials.  
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Anxiety and depression symptoms. Depressive symptoms were assessed with Patient 
Health Questionnaire 9 (PHQ-9; Kroenke & Spitzer, 2002; Cronbach’s α = .73) and anxiety 
symptoms using the Generalized Anxiety Disorder 7-item scale (GAD-7; Spitzer et al., 2006; 
Cronbach’s α = .71).  
Procedure 
Participants completed questionnaires (PSWQ, RRS, PHQ-9, GAD-7, RNTQ) online 
within 24 hours prior to the first study visit. At the first visit, participants provided informed 
consent and were randomized by diagnostic group to one of the three conditions: 1) 
CBM_RNT, 2) CBM_STAND or 3) CONTROL (see Experimental conditions section above 
for details), and completed the scrambled sentences test, recognition test, and breathing focus 
task5. Then, participants were given a brief study rationale for the online sessions and 
completed expectancy ratings6 before completing the first online session on the study 
website7. Each online session included the RNT induction (CBM_RNT) or neutral task 
(CBM_STAND and CONTROL conditions), followed by 50 scenarios (see above), with a 
short break after 25 scenarios. Following the first online session, participants completed the 
recognition test again.8 Lastly, participants were presented with instructions for completing 
the nine online sessions at home over the course of the next month.  
Participants then completed nine online sessions. We encouraged them to complete 
three sessions per week, with the expectation that there would be some slippage and thus we 
allowed up to one month in total. They were required to complete at least 8 online sessions 
                                                 
5Participants also completed the classic and emotional Stroop task during both experimental sessions. These 
were included for comparison with future experiments and did not relate to the current study aims. Results are 
presented in Additional Supplementary Materials. 
6Results for expectancy and acceptability ratings (acceptability ratings were obtained at visit 2) are reported in 
Additional Supplementary Materials; participants expected the program to be moderately logical and useful, and 
indicated that the conditions (including the active control condition) were similar in this respect prior to training. 
After completing the program, participants in the CBM-I conditions reported the program to have been more 
useful than did those in the control condition. 
7 Participants were blind to their condition; experimenters were not blind to participants’ condition, since they 
guided participants though the first online session on the website, which differed by condition. 
8The findings for within-visit change on the RT are reported in Additional Supplementary Materials. 
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within one month with the final session no later than the day before their second (post-
training) visit9. Researchers monitored adherence to the online sessions using the online 
platform. They kept in touch with participants by using participants’ preferred method of 
contact (email, phone, SMS) to facilitate engagement and trouble shoot issues, and encourage 
participants to catch up with missed sessions.  
Up to 24 hours before returning for their second (post-training) visit, participants 
completed PSWQ, RRS, PHQ-9, GAD-7, RNTQ questionnaires, and an “adverse events 
form” for the period since the first session11. Participants also completed acceptability, 
assimilation and imagination ratings (in reference to the home-based sessions10), and then 
completed the scrambled sentences test, recognition test, and breathing focus task, before 
being debriefed in general about the study. One month after their second study visit, 
participants completed the PSWQ, RRS, PHQ-9, GAD-7, RNTQ questionnaires, and the 
“adverse events form”11. Participants received £130 ($170) for their participation in the study. 
The study was approved by the ethics committee of the authors’ university. Recruitment and 
testing commenced in January 2016 and final follow-up data was collected in January 2017. 
Plan of Statistical Analyses 
Statistical analyses were carried out in Stata 14 (StataCorp, 2015). Only participants 
who had completed at least 8 of the 10 online sessions were viewed as ‘completers’ and 
included in analyses.  
Assessing the impact of multi-session CBM-I (Hypothesis 1) and modulatory role 
of RNT prior to CBM-I (Hypothesis 2). 
                                                 
9The average time between visits 1 and 2 was M = 22.76 days (SD = 2.82), indicating that participants completed 
the online sessions in just over three weeks; 74% of participants completed all 10 online sessions, 20% 
completed 9 sessions, and 6% completed 8 sessions. 
10Findings are presented in Additional Supplementary Materials. 
11 The average time between visit 2 and completing the follow-up questionnaire was M = 31.93 days (SD = 
5.49), indicating that the follow-up period was one month, as intended. 
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To assess the impact of multi-session CBM-I on our outcome measures (Hypothesis 
1), we first compared both CBM-I conditions (combined) to the active control condition. To 
then investigate the potential modulatory role of prior RNT (Hypothesis 2), we contrasted 
only the two CBM-I conditions (CBM_RNT vs. CBM_STAND) and did not include the 
control condition. Our RNT manipulation check confirmed that the two CBM-I conditions 
differed as intended, i.e., that we successfully induced RNT prior to CBM-I in the CBM_RNT 
condition, by comparing self-report ratings of worry, rumination, anxiety, and depression 
(averaged across online sessions) immediately after RNT induction (CBM_RNT condition) 
vs. the neutral filler task (CBM_STAND) using a MANOVA12. Below, we outline the 
analytic strategy for testing Hypotheses 1 and 2 for each of our outcome measures. 
Interpretation bias. For measures of interpretation bias, we collapsed analyses across 
diagnostic groups and conducted regression analyses (with bootstrapped standard errors in the 
case of non-normally distributed data) with mean score at the (post-training) second visit as 
the outcome variable and condition (combined CBM-I vs. control to address Hypothesis 1; 
CBM_RNT vs. CBM_STAND to address Hypothesis 2) as the predictor variable, and 
controlled for scores at the first visit (i.e., baseline scores). Establishing that our CBM-I 
training was successful in promoting a more positive interpretation bias was an important pre-
requisite for assessing its consequent impact in terms of RNT and mood.  
Repetitive negative thinking. For the self-report measures of worry and rumination, 
we again collapsed across diagnostic groups to see the overall impact of training. For worry 
and rumination separately, we specified multi-level regression models with mean 
questionnaire score as the outcome variables and condition (see above), post-training time 
                                                 
12The two CBM-I conditions (with and without prior RNT) differed on worry, rumination, anxiety and 
depression ratings immediately post RNT induction vs. neutral filler task (averaged across all online sessions), 
F(4, 82) = 23.95, p < .001, Wilk’s lamda = .461. All ratings were higher in the CBM_RNT than CBM_STAND 
condition, as expected (see Integral Supplementary Table 1 for follow-up regression analyses and marginal 
means, also separately by group). 
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point (visit 2 and follow up) as predictor variables, and controlled for mean score at visit 1. A 
random effect was included to account for the repeated assessment of the outcome variable 
within individuals. Subsequently, we conducted planned subgroup analyses stratifying by 
diagnostic groups by specifying multi-group models (see Krahe et al., 2016) to examine 
whether there were any diagnosis-specific effects.  
The breathing focus task included a further between-subjects factor of assessor type 
(participant self-report vs. independent assessor) and a repeated-measures factor of breathing 
focus period (pre-/post- induction of RNT). We specified a multi-level regression model with 
mean number of negative thought intrusions as the outcome variable and condition (as above), 
visit (visit 1, visit 2), assessor type (participant self-report vs. independent assessor), and 
breathing focus period (pre-/post- induction of RNT) as predictor variables. A random effect 
accounted for the repeated assessment of the outcome variable within individuals. 
Anxiety and depression symptoms. For measures of anxiety and depression 
symptoms, we followed the same analytic strategy as that described for measures of worry 
and rumination above and report reliable change scores in Integral Supplementary Materials.  
Assessing whether effects of CBM-I on worry, rumination, anxiety and 
depression were partially mediated by interpretation bias (Hypothesis 3). 
To test Hypothesis 3, we examined whether change in interpretation bias partially 
mediated the effects of training on outcome measures at follow up using structural equation 
modelling following the product of coefficients approach (seen to be superior to the approach 
advocated by Baron & Kenny, 1986; Iacobucci, Saldanha, & Deng, 2007). In particular, we 
specified models to test whether interpretation bias (analyses run separately for SST and RT) 
mediated the effects of condition (combined CBM-I vs. control) on worry, rumination, 
anxiety, and depression scores at 1-month follow up (controlling for bias scores and symptom 
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scores at visit 1). Bootstrapping with 1000 replications estimated the standard errors. The 
proportion of the effect explained by the indirect path was calculated. The analyses were run 
across diagnostic groups.  
Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics for outcome measures by condition and time point across 
diagnostic groups are presented in Table 2. 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
Effects of Multi-Session CBM-I Training Compared to an Active Control Condition 
Interpretation bias. 
On the Scrambled Sentences Test, one participant was excluded from analyses for 
failing to complete any sentences in a grammatically correct fashion, leaving 130 participants 
for this analysis. Across diagnostic groups, the regression analysis showed that condition 
(combined CBM-I vs. control) was significantly associated with positivity index at visit 2 
(Hedges’ g = .33; see Table 2 for descriptive statistics and model results). As expected, 
participants in the combined CBM-I condition made more positive interpretations compared 
to the control condition following the 3-week online program. On the Recognition Test, one 
participant was excluded for not completing the task correctly, leaving 130 participants for 
this analysis. Across diagnostic groups, condition (combined CBM-I vs. control) was 
significantly associated with recognition test index at visit 2 (Hedges’ g = .37; see Table 2). 
Participants made more positive (vs. negative) interpretations in the combined CBM-I 
compared to the control condition, as expected. Thus, findings on both measures of 
interpretation bias supported Hypothesis 1: interpretation bias was more positive following 
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CBM-I training compared to the active control condition, though the size of the effect was 
small to moderate. Having established change in interpretation bias, its impact on RNT and 
symptoms of anxiety and depression could now be assessed. 
Levels of worry and rumination.  
Self-report measures of worry (PSWQ) and rumination (RRS).  
Seven participants were excluded from analyses of all the self-report questionnaires 
because they reported taking up psychological treatment between visit 2 and follow up (n = 4) 
or because they failed to complete the follow-up questionnaire (n = 3), leaving 124 
participants for these multi-level regression analyses.  
PSWQ. Across diagnostic groups, CBM-I was associated with significantly lower 
worry scores than the control condition at follow up but not visit 2 (see Table 2; Hedges’ gvisit2 
= .15, Hedges’ gfollowup = .29). A subgroup analysis examining whether the effect of condition 
was diagnosis specific revealed that the effect of CBM-I (vs. control) on worry was 
significant for the GAD group at follow up (Hedges’ g = .30; see Table 3 for model results for 
subgroup analyses and descriptive statistics by group); the effect size for the MDD group was 
smaller and non-significant (Hedges’ g = .12). Thus, at follow up, worry scores were lower 
following CBM-I than the control condition across diagnostic groups, supporting Hypothesis 
1. This effect appeared to be most evident in the GAD group. 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
RRS. Across diagnostic groups, CBM-I was significantly associated with lower 
rumination scores than the control condition at both post-training time points (see Table 2; 
Hedges’ gvisit2 = .31, Hedges’ gfollowup = .51), supporting Hypothesis 1. Additionally, a 
subgroup analysis revealed that the effect of CBM-I on rumination was significant for the 
Interpretation training for repetitive negative thinking 
23 
 
MDD group at visit 2 (Hedges’ g = .39) and the GAD group at follow up (Hedges’ g = .39), 
although the effect size for the MDD group at follow up was of similar magnitude (Hedges’ g 
= .36; see Table 3). Thus, post-training rumination scores were lower in the CBM-I than the 
control condition in both diagnostic groups, supporting Hypothesis 1.  
Breathing focus task. For both self-reported and assessor-rated negative intrusions, 
condition was not significantly associated with number of negative thought intrusions post 
training, either before (Hedges’ gselfreport = .24, Hedges’ gassessor = .24) or after (Hedges’ 
gselfreport = .29, Hedges’ gassessor = .21) the RNT induction period (see Table 2). Thus, CBM-I 
training did not differ from the control condition, contrary to Hypothesis 1.  
Taken together, there is sufficient evidence to conclude that effects of CBM-I training 
(vs. control) transferred to self-reported levels of worry and rumination, but not to a more 
behavioral measure of negative thought intrusions, providing partial support for Hypothesis 1. 
Self-reported levels of anxiety (GAD-7) and depression (PHQ-9).  
GAD-7. Across diagnostic groups, CBM-I was not associated with lower anxiety 
scores than the control condition at either time point, although the estimated effects at follow 
up were in the expected direction (see Table 2; Hedges’ gvisit2 = .04, Hedges’ gfollowup = .27). A 
subgroup analysis examining whether the effect of condition was diagnosis specific revealed 
that the effect of CBM-I (vs. control) on anxiety was significant for the GAD group at follow 
up (Hedges’ g = .56, see Table 3); the effect size for the MDD group at follow up was in the 
opposite direction (Hedges’ g = -.16). At follow up, anxiety scores were lower in the CBM-I 
than the control condition in the GAD group only, partially supporting Hypothesis 1.  
PHQ-9. Across diagnostic groups, CBM-I was significantly associated with lower 
depression scores than the control condition at both post-training time points (see Table 2; 
Hedges’ gvisit2 = .39, Hedges’ gfollowup = .35), supporting Hypothesis 1. Additionally, a 
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subgroup analysis revealed that the effect of CBM-I on depression was significant for the 
MDD group at visit 2 (Hedges’ g = .48), and, though not significant, effect sizes for the GAD 
group at visit 2 and follow up were of similar magnitude (Hedges’ gvisit2 = .31, Hedges’ 
gfollowup = .30; see Table 3). Thus, post-training depression scores were lower in the CBM-I 
than the control condition across both groups, supporting Hypothesis 1.  
 Overall, the findings provide support for Hypothesis 1. Across groups, CBM-I – with 
and without prior RNT activation – promoted a more positive interpretation bias and reduced 
levels of worry and rumination (though on self-report measures only), and levels of 
depression relative to the active control condition. Beneficial effects of CBM-I on levels of 
anxiety appeared specific to the GAD group. 
Potential Modulatory Role of Prior RNT on the Effects of CBM-I Training 
Results for the comparison of the two CBM-I conditions on outcome measures are 
presented in Integral Supplementary Tables 2 and 3. Contrary to Hypothesis 2, we found no 
significant differences between CBM_RNT and CBM_STAND conditions on any of the 
outcome measures. Thus, there was insufficient evidence to conclude that engaging in RNT 
prior to completing CBM-I training modulated the effects of CBM-I on outcome measures. 
Assessing Whether Interpretation Bias Post Training Partially Mediated Effects of 
CBM-I on Outcomes at Follow Up 
To test Hypothesis 3, we examined whether change in interpretation bias at visit 2 
mediated the effect of condition (combined CBM-I vs. control) on outcome measures at 1-
month follow up, using structural equation modelling. Interpretation bias as measured by SST 
(but not RT) partially mediated the effect of CBM-I on worry, rumination, anxiety, and 
depression (see Table 4 for all results). The indirect path from condition to PSWQ, RRS, and 
GAD-7 scores via SST visit 2 score were significant: the proportion of the effect mediated 
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was .36 for PSWQ, .24 for RRS, and .31 for GAD-7. The indirect path from condition to 
PHQ-9 score via SST visit 2 score approached significance (p = .054), and the proportion of 
the effect mediated was .23. Thus, a quarter to a third of the effect of condition on follow-up 
questionnaire scores was mediated by level of interpretation bias (as measured by the SST) 
after completing the online program, providing partial support for Hypothesis 313. 
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
Discussion 
Overall, consistent with our main hypothesis, online training designed to reduce 
negative interpretation bias was effective in promoting a more positive interpretation bias and 
in reducing the targeted form of RNT and depressed mood across both diagnostic groups 
(GAD and depression). There was no evidence for CBM-I effects on a more behavioral 
measure of RNT, i.e., the number of negative thought intrusions reported immediately after 
training, and effects varied according to diagnosis for anxiety symptoms, as will be discussed 
later. However, the overall pattern of results supported the effectiveness of the current training 
in reducing worry and rumination, with related improvements in depression and anxiety.  
It is not clear why this finding differs from some other reports of failure to obtain 
persisting change in clinical symptoms following internet delivered CBM (e.g., Blackwell et 
al., 2015; Carlbring et al., 2012). Possible reasons include differences in the type of training 
used, the bias that was targeted, the clinical status of participants, and the control condition 
used, perhaps in different combinations across studies. For example, Carlbring et al. (2012) 
                                                 
13 In addition, to demonstrate that change in cognitive bias was related to change in symptoms, we computed 
bivariate correlations for change scores (visit 2 minus visit 1, as we did not have follow-up data for bias 
measures) for the combined CBM-I condition. Bias change on the SST (an increase in positivity) was 
significantly correlated with all measures of symptom change (a reduction in scores; Pearson’s r’s ranged from -
.26 to -.38, p < .05), while – mirroring the mediation results – bias change on the RT was not correlated with 
symptom change, apart from one significant correlation between RT change and change on the GAD-7 (r = -.24, 
p < .05). 
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studied the effect of attention training on social anxiety, and suggested that their null results 
may have been due to the lack of emotional activation during home practice. The improved 
outcome in a follow-up study (Kuckertz et al., 2014) was thus attributed to the requirement of 
engaging in social activity prior to training sessions at home. However, this form of activation 
necessarily involves exposure to feared situations, which may itself be sufficient to account 
for the greater improvement seen in their second (follow-up) study.  
Some other studies (e.g., Blackwell et al., 2015) used similar interpretation training 
methods, but used a control condition in which ambiguous events were resolved in a negative 
manner half the time and positively in the other half. As noted by these authors, relative to 
their own short-term experimental studies, this control condition resulted in greater reduction 
in depressed mood over longer training, perhaps related to participants learning that ambiguity 
can be resolved in different (and sometimes positive) ways. Whatever the explanation, this 
unexpected improvement in the 50:50 control condition in Blackwell et al. (2015) may have 
partly accounted for the failure to show superiority of interpretation training. As noted in the 
earlier discussion of Blackwell et al. (2017), to address our research question, we elected to 
use a control condition that left ambiguous training items unresolved, and this did not result in 
marked changes in bias over time, thus allowing a more sensitive assessment of the causal 
role of negative interpretations in RNT.  
An additional hypothesis in the present study, namely that priming negative concerns 
via RNT might modulate training effects, was not supported. This latter hypothesis was based 
(in part) on prior animal and human research on memory reconsolidation, showing that 
activation of old fear memories shortly prior to incompatible re-learning renders the original 
memories more malleable (Jaffe, 2013). Our extrapolation assumed that RNT is at least partly 
based on prior memories. However, the type of memory involved in cognitive bias may be 
more procedural in nature (e.g., in the form of a habitual production rule), rather than episodic 
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as in memory for unambiguous fear-inducing events. Furthermore, some evidence suggests 
that emotional memories are more resistant to change in highly anxious individuals (Kindt & 
Soeter, 2013). For this or other procedural reasons (e.g., activation was immediately followed 
by CBM-I rather than after a delay, that may be critical for reconsolidation), our assumption 
that RNT activation could enhance CBM-I was not supported. Furthermore, given the lack of 
a modulatory role of prior RNT, the suggestion that activation via RNT may have the counter-
productive effect of interfering with the cognitive resources needed for relearning was also 
not supported. It is conceivable that the two (beneficial vs. detrimental) effects cancelled each 
other out, but we see no evidence to support this somewhat implausible idea. Future research 
could investigate whether more prolonged RNT activation and a rest period between RNT 
activation and CBM (more closely mirroring the conditions thought critical for the intended 
reconsolidation effect) are necessary for beneficial effects of activation in CBM-I to manifest. 
As noted earlier, although the overall pattern of results held over both diagnostic 
groups, there were some minor differences. It is perhaps not surprising that bias modification 
would have greater effects on emotional responses characteristic of the given clinical 
condition. Specifically, a training-related reduction in anxiety was found at follow up only in 
participants diagnosed with GAD. It may be that promoting more positive interpretations 
related to rumination did not transfer to reductions in anxiety, perhaps because rumination is 
less anxiogenic than worry. Nevertheless, by follow-up, reductions in worry were found 
across diagnostic groups (although most evident in GAD), and changes in rumination were of 
similar magnitude in both GAD and depression at follow up. These findings suggest that 
training interpretations related to one form of RNT can transfer to reductions in the other form 
of RNT, consistent with the possibility that interpretation bias is a common cognitive 
mechanism underlying both worry and rumination. 
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However, while reductions in rumination and depression were evident across 
diagnostic groups at both post-training time points, reductions in worry and anxiety (the latter 
confined to the GAD group) were significant at 1-month follow up only. It is possible that 
rumination and corresponding low mood may be more changeable than worry and anxiety; 
indeed, a diagnosis of depression is currently based on the last month, while a diagnosis of 
GAD is based on the last six months (American Psychiatric Association, 2013).  Furthermore, 
while natural remission is common in depression, GAD tends to follow a chronic time course 
(Kessler, Keller, & Wittchen, 2001). Thus, although interpretation bias seems to play a role in 
both worry and rumination, the time course and route by which it influences anxiety and 
depression may differ between the two clinical disorders.  
A related limitation is that the greater changes in bias following training were not 
reflected in similar differential reductions of negative intrusive thoughts during the breathing 
focus task.  For participants with GAD, training effects on worry and anxiety were not 
apparent until follow-up, rather than earlier, at the time at which intrusive thoughts were 
reassessed. Future research could therefore involve later assessment of negative intrusions to 
evaluate whether these change at follow up operate in concert with reported reductions in 
worry. In depression, it may be that interpretation bias is less involved in promoting 
intrusions, as opposed to persistence of RNT, which was not assessed in this task but may be 
particularly relevant to rumination. Testing these ideas would require a different method, 
assessing the duration and negativity of RNT episodes, instead of only intrusion frequency, 
and at follow up as well as earlier.  Mediation analyses suggested that interpretation bias as 
measured by the Scrambled Sentence Task (SST) partially mediated changes in both worry 
and rumination, as well as anxiety (with a similar but non-significant trend in depression 
symptoms). In contrast, bias as measured in the recognition test was not found to mediate 
outcome, nor to correlate with changes in RNT. There are a number of differences between 
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these two measures of interpretation that might contribute to this differential mediation. The 
recognition test is much closer in format to training items than is the SST, while the latter 
involves more active selection and rejection of simultaneously presented alternatives.  
Conceivably, these differences result in the SST more closely representing the processes 
required to select positive and reject competing negative interpretations in real life situations, 
thus accounting for more evidence of mediation. This idea could be investigated in future 
studies by building in systematic variations to the type of interpretation tests used, with the 
hypothesis that versions having more novel format, and demanding more active selection, are 
more likely to mediate generalization to RNT and related symptoms.  
A final limitation was that we included participants with either GAD or depression, 
but not with a dual diagnosis of both disorders. This decision was in part related to difficulties 
in assigning participants to training materials (whether they should receive worry or 
rumination materials or a mix of both). However, given the high comorbidity of GAD and 
depression and our finding that training related to one form of RNT also transferred to the 
other form, future research could include participants with both GAD and depression, which 
would increase both the diversity of the sample and the generalizability of the findings. In a 
related vein, future research could seek to extend the 1-month follow up period to examine 
whether changes in symptoms are maintained over longer periods.  
Despite the above limitations, we believe the present study also has several strengths. 
Including participants with diagnoses of GAD or Depression meant that participants had 
pathological levels of worry and rumination at study baseline. Interestingly, the drop out from 
the study was low, despite it involving many home-based online sessions, indicating that 
interpretation bias training is an acceptable form of intervention, even for those with 
depression, where engagement can sometimes be particularly challenging. Furthermore, the 
present study is the first to examine the effects of multi-session CBM-I on worry and 
Interpretation training for repetitive negative thinking 
30 
 
rumination within the same experimental study. The inclusion of two separate measures of 
interpretation bias, with effects of training evident for both, is a further strength. CBM was 
originally developed as an experimental tool to assess the causal role of cognitive biases in 
maintaining psychopathology. While other research in the field sets out to examine CBM’s 
potential therapeutic application, a strength of our experimental research is that is focuses on 
understanding underlying mechanisms of RNT and as such was not intended to be a clinical 
trial. We believe that this experimental approach to enhancing understanding of mechanisms 
and moderators will facilitate the development of improved interventions in the future. 
Given our main aim of understanding the causal role of interpretation bias in RNT, we 
conclude by briefly considering how negative interpretations may operate to maintain RNT. 
When individuals encounter ambiguous information, a tendency to generate negative 
interpretations will enhance the perceived threat and may thus serve to initiate an episode of 
RNT.  Once begun, interpretation bias operating on the content of RNT itself is likely to 
direct thoughts to the worst possibilities, enhancing the negativity of RNT content (see Hirsch 
& Mathews, 2012). Furthermore, other cognitive biases may then also influence these streams 
of negative thinking, for example, a tendency to think in more verbal abstract ways (Hirsch, 
Hayes, Mathews, Perman, & Borkovec, 2012), as well as a depletion of the cognitive 
resources required to shift away from negative content (Stefanopoulou et al., 2014), both of 
which impede stopping RNT and shifting to alternative content.  
Clearly, future research needs to address the aim of enhancing training methods and 
unequivocally establishing the causal role of emotional processing biases. For example, rather 
than activation via RNT, another route to enhancing training effects may be to identify and 
remediate individual obstacles to bias malleability, such as the failure to engage with or 
identify with the material used in training (see Standage, Harris, & Fox, 2014). Nevertheless, 
in contrast to recent failures to demonstrate improvements following internet-delivered CBM, 
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we have shown that self-reported RNT and negative mood can be reduced by home-based 
CBM-I. This is consistent with a causal role for negative interpretation bias in both worry and 
rumination, suggesting a useful role for CBM-I within treatments for anxiety and depression.  
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Table 1. Demographic Characteristics By Condition (Across Both Diagnostic Groups). 
    CBM_RNT CBM_STAND Control 
Age - mean (SD) 29.76 (11.49) 29.47 (10.88) 30.59 (11.17) 
Gender (F/M) 32/11 38/6 38/6 
Nationality - N 
(%) 
  
British 31 (72.09) 34 (77.27) 34 (77.27) 
Other European 7 (16.28) 6 (13.64) 7 (15.91) 
World 5 (11.63) 4 (9.09) 3 (6.82) 
Highest level of 
education - N 
(%) 
  
  
Secondary 13 (30.23) 8 (18.18) 12 (27.27) 
Bachelor 17 (39.53) 21 (47.73) 20 (45.45) 
Master 9 (20.93) 8 (18.18) 10 (22.73) 
Doctoral 0 (0) 0 (0) 2 (4.55) 
Other 4 (9.3) 7 (15.91) 0 (0) 
Marital status - 
N (%) 
  
 
Single, never 
married 
35 (81.4) 32 (72.73) 30 (68.18) 
Married /domestic 
partnership 
6 (13.95) 10 (22.73) 10 (22.73) 
Separated, 
divorced, widowed 
2 (4.65) 2 (4.55) 4 (9.09) 
 
Note. CBM_RNT = Cognitive Bias Modification for Interpretation with prior repetitive 
negative thinking; CBM_STAND = Cognitive Bias Modification for Interpretation without 
prior repetitive negative thinking
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics And Model Results For Combined CBM-I Vs. Control Condition For All Outcome Measures Across Groups. 
  
  
    CBM-I Control Adjusted mean difference  
Time point Pre-/post RNT 
induction 
N Mean SD N Mean SD b SE p value 95% CI 
lower 
95% CI 
higher 
Hedges’ 
g 
SST  Visit 1  87 0.44 0.18 43 0.50 0.20       
Visit 2  87 0.57 0.20 43 0.54 0.23 -0.07 0.03 0.035 -0.13 0.00 0.33 
RT Visit 1  87 -0.20 0.72 43 -0.11 0.70       
Visit 2  87 0.52 0.67 43 0.28 0.86 -0.28 0.12 0.026 -0.52 -0.03 0.37 
PSWQ Visit 1  86 67.55 6.90 38 64.82 8.45       
Visit 2  86 64.56 8.45 38 63.68 8.48 1.26 1.41 0.372 -1.51 4.03 0.15 
Follow up  86 60.27 10.09 38 61.13 9.84 3.00 1.41 0.034 0.23 5.77 0.29 
RRS Visit 1  86 60.50 10.50 38 59.24 12.03       
Visit 2  86 54.09 11.26 38 56.92 12.88 3.68 1.86 0.048 0.03 7.33 0.31 
Follow up  86 47.40 11.86 38 53.11 13.89 6.56 1.86 0.000 2.91 10.21 0.51 
BFT-self Visit 1 Pre 87 3.36 2.28 44 3.11 2.51 -0.24 0.41 0.554 -1.05 0.56 -0.10 
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report Post 87 3.72 2.37 44 3.45 2.77 -0.27 0.41 0.511 -1.07 0.53 -0.11 
Visit 2 Pre 87 1.74 1.74 44 2.23 2.37 0.49 0.41 0.230 -0.31 1.29 0.24 
Post 87 2.03 1.93 44 2.70 2.77 0.67 0.41 0.102 -0.13 1.47 0.29 
BFT-
assessor 
Visit 1 Pre 87 2.18 2.01 41 2.34 2.54 0.10 0.42 0.809 -0.71 0.92 0.04 
Post 87 3.07 2.32 40 3.25 2.89 0.09 0.42 0.825 -0.73 0.91 0.04 
Visit 2 Pre 85 1.27 1.55 44 1.75 2.15 0.44 0.41 0.286 -0.37 1.24 0.24 
Post 87 1.79 2.00 43 2.30 2.56 0.47 0.41 0.257 -0.34 1.27 0.21 
GAD-7 Visit 1  86 13.55 3.53 38 13.89 3.10       
Visit 2  86 11.07 4.69 38 11.42 4.10 0.17 0.87 0.844 -1.53 1.87 0.04 
Follow up  86 8.57 5.04 38 10.18 5.29 1.43 0.87 0.099 -0.27 3.14 0.27 
PHQ-9 Visit 1  86 14.36 4.37 38 14.92 4.56       
Visit 2  86 10.63 4.93 38 12.97 5.55 2.02 0.93 0.030 0.20 3.85 0.39 
Follow up  86 8.97 5.40 38 11.37 6.49 2.08 0.93 0.026 0.25 3.90 0.35 
Note. CBM-I = Cognitive Bias Modification for Interpretation; RNT = Repetitive Negative Thinking; SST = Scrambled Sentences Test; RT = 
Recognition Test; BFT = Breathing focus task (self-reported intrusions only); PSWQ = Penn State Worry Questionnaire; RRS = Ruminative 
Response Scale; PHQ-9 = Patient Health Questionnaire (measure of depression); GAD-7 = Generalized Anxiety Disorder scale (measure of anxiety) 
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics And Model Results For Subgroup Analyses For Questionnaire Measures In Combined CBM-I Vs. Control Condition. 
      CBM-I Control Adjusted mean difference  
Time point Group N Mean SD N Mean SD b SE p value 95% CI lower 95% CI higher Hedges’ g 
PSWQ Visit 1 MDD 42 65.52 7.07 18 62.28 9.74       
GAD 44 69.48 6.22 20 67.10 6.54       
Visit 2 MDD 42 63.76 7.38 18 61.33 9.65 -0.21 1.70 0.901 -3.55 3.12 -0.02 
GAD 44 65.32 9.39 20 65.80 6.84 2.63 1.77 0.137 -0.84 6.09 0.29 
Follow up MDD 42 58.90 9.78 18 58.06 10.24 1.22 2.31 0.598 -3.32 5.76 0.12 
GAD 44 61.57 10.33 20 63.90 8.82 3.07 1.49 0.040 0.14 6.00 0.30 
RRS Visit 1 MDD 42 61.81 10.07 18 63.67 9.54       
GAD 44 59.25 10.87 20 55.25 12.85       
Visit 2 MDD 42 55.43 10.81 18 61.33 11.19 4.45 2.13 0.037 0.27 8.63 0.39 
GAD 44 52.82 11.66 20 52.95 13.26 2.69 2.61 0.301 -2.42 7.80 0.21 
Follow up MDD 42 48.19 11.66 18 55.11 14.51 4.66 2.99 0.119 -1.2 10.53 0.36 
GAD 44 46.64 12.14 20 51.30 13.41 5.14 2.10 0.014 1.02 9.25 0.39 
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GAD-7 Visit 1 MDD 42 13.07 3.85 18 13.17 2.55       
GAD 44 14.00 3.18 20 14.55 3.46       
Visit 2 MDD 42 10.52 4.44 18 11.72 3.94 1.14 1.03 0.267 -0.87 3.15 0.25 
GAD 44 11.59 4.91 20 11.15 4.33 -0.66 1.21 0.588 -3.04 1.72 -0.13 
Follow up MDD 42 8.76 4.45 18 8.72 5.39 -0.79 1.07 0.461 -2.89 1.31 -0.16 
GAD 44 8.39 5.58 20 11.50 4.96 3.17 1.15 0.006 0.92 5.43 0.56 
PHQ-9 Visit 1 MDD 42 15.6 4.70 18 16.94 3.57       
GAD 44 13.18 3.71 20 13.10 4.66       
Visit 2 MDD 42 11.17 4.61 18 14.33 5.65 2.45 1.22 0.044 0.07 4.83 0.48 
GAD 44 10.11 5.23 20 11.75 5.31 1.69 1.23 0.169 -0.72 4.09 0.31 
Follow up MDD 42 9.17 5.06 18 11.22 7.22 -0.32 1.24 0.798 -2.74 2.11 -0.05 
GAD 44 8.77 5.75 20 11.50 5.95 1.83 1.20 0.128 -0.53 4.18 0.30 
Note. CBM-I = Cognitive Bias Modification for Interpretation; PSWQ = Penn State Worry Questionnaire; RRS = Ruminative Response Scale; 
PHQ-9 = Patient Health Questionnaire (measure of depression); GAD-7 = Generalized Anxiety Disorder scale (measure of anxiety); GAD = 
Generalized Anxiety Disorder; MDD = Depression
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Table 4. Mediation Analyses Assessing Whether Interpretation Bias Post Training Mediates 
Effects Of CBM-I Vs. Control On Questionnaire Measures Of Repetitive Negative Thinking 
And Mood At Follow-up.  
    Effect b bootstrapped SE p value 
SST PSWQ 
  
  
  
Direct 2.16 1.43 0.131 
Indirect 1.23 0.60 0.041 
Total 3.39 1.46 0.020 
Proportion mediated 0.36     
RRS 
  
  
  
Direct 5.55 1.98 0.005 
Indirect 1.73 0.78 0.026 
Total 7.28 2.11 0.001 
Proportion mediated 0.24     
GAD-7 
  
  
  
Direct 1.38 0.77 0.075 
Indirect 0.62 0.31 0.044 
Total 2.00 0.79 0.012 
Proportion mediated 0.31     
PHQ-9 
  
  
  
Direct 2.07 0.89 0.020 
Indirect 0.63 0.33 0.054 
Total 2.71 0.94 0.004 
Proportion mediated 0.23     
RT PSWQ 
  
  
  
Direct 1.87 1.54 0.227 
Indirect 1.05 0.64 0.099 
Total 2.92 1.59 0.067 
Proportion mediated 0.36     
Interpretation training for repetitive negative thinking 
45 
 
RRS 
  
  
  
Direct 4.85 2.13 0.023 
Indirect 1.35 0.87 0.121 
Total 6.20 2.21 0.005 
Proportion mediated 0.22     
GAD-7 
  
  
  
Direct 0.80 0.90 0.377 
Indirect 0.55 0.32 0.093 
Total 1.34 0.94 0.154 
Proportion mediated 0.41     
PHQ-9 
  
  
  
Direct 1.53 1.03 0.135 
Indirect 0.44 0.31 0.157 
Total 1.98 1.07 0.065 
Proportion mediated 0.22     
 
Note. SST = Scrambled Sentences Test; RT = Recognition Test; PSWQ = Penn State Worry 
Questionnaire; RRS = Ruminative Response Scale; PHQ-9 = Patient Health Questionnaire 
(measure of depression); GAD-7 = Generalized Anxiety Disorder scale (measure of anxiety)
Interpretation training for repetitive negative thinking 
46 
 
 
